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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MARIO JOSE LLIN SANTANA, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A044-446-371) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2014 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 







 Mario Llin Santana, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States in 1994.  In 1997, he pled guilty to and was 
convicted of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, in 





from a trip to the Dominican Republic and was questioned by an immigration official.  
He admitted to his prior conviction, though he claimed that he only pled guilty because 
his attorney told him to.  He was subsequently served with a Notice to Appear charging 
him as inadmissible under both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), as an alien who has been 
convicted of “a violation of . . . any law . . . of a State . . . relating to a controlled 
substance,” and § 1182(a)(2)(C), as an alien who the Attorney General knows or has 
reason to believe “has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance.”  Those 
charges were sustained, and he was ordered removed.   
 Llin Santana’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) was 
dismissed on June 5, 2013, and he timely petitioned for review.1  Because Llin Santana 
was found removable due to a conviction of a controlled substance offense, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), we lack jurisdiction to review his final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), except to the extent that he raises constitutional claims or questions of 
law.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  As a threshold matter, such claims must be colorable, 
i.e., non-frivolous.  See Pareja v. Att’y Gen.
 Llin Santana presently claims that the Government failed to demonstrate that his 
conviction constituted a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).  
However, no such demonstration is required; any conviction for a crime involving a 
, 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010). 
                                              
1 The Government incorrectly argues that Llin Santana’s petition for review was untimely 
filed on July 8, 2013.  The petition for review was received by the Court on July 3, 2013, 
28 days after the Board’s dismissal of his appeal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (providing 





controlled substance is grounds for inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  See 
Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the statutory 
language indicates Congress’s “intent to sweep broadly, applying to a violation of ‘any 
law or regulation,’ whether state, federal, or foreign, ‘relating to a controlled substance’”) 
(quoting § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)); see also Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 160 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (noting that the phrase “relating to” is to be read expansively).  Moreover, Llin 
Santana does not challenge the BIA’s holding that all of the substances criminalized by 
NYPL § 220.39 are included in the CSA, and they are.2  Thus, any conviction under 
NYPL § 220.39 constitutes a violation of a law “relating to a controlled substance” as 
defined by the CSA and justifies a finding of inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) 
irrespective of whether the record identifies the substance involved.  Cf. Rojas v. Att’y 
Gen.
                                              
2 The CSA provides a list of “controlled substances” at 21 U.S.C. § 812, which is 
supplemented by 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11–.15.  Borrome, 687 F.3d at 158.  The Federal 
Analog Act further provides that the analog of any of the listed substances shall 
themselves be treated as a controlled substance under schedule I.  21 U.S.C. § 813.  
NYPL § 220.39 criminalizes the sale of numerous classes of drugs which are enumerated 
in NY Public Health Law § 3306.  All of the substances that could be involved in a 
conviction under NYPL § 220.39 are either included in the CSA or are analogues of 
listed substances.  Compare NYPL § 220.39 and NY Public Health Law § 3306 with 21 
U.S.C. §§ 802(6); 812(c); 813. 
, 728 F.3d 203, 204, 206 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that the Government was 
required to prove the identity of the controlled substance involved in a Pennsylvania 
offense where “Pennsylvania’s controlled substances schedules list drugs that are not in 





met his burden to demonstrate his inadmissibility because the record simply refers to a 
“dangerous drug,” his claim is frivolous.   
 The petition for review presents no colorable claims,3 and we will dismiss it for 
lack of jurisdiction.  Pareja
 
, 615 F.3d at 186.  
                                              
3 Because Llin Santana is inarguably inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), any 
challenge to the BIA’s determination that he is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(C) is 
frivolous.  Llin Santana’s contention that he is actually innocent of the crime at issue and 
pled guilty only on the advice of counsel also is not colorable; a conviction remains a 
conviction for immigration purposes unless and until it is overturned, which Llin Santana 
does not allege has occurred here.  See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198–99 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, these claims are beyond our jurisdiction.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D); Pareja, 615 F.3d at 186.   
